The layer 2 switch must have the native VLAN assigned to an ID other than the default VLAN for all 802.1q trunk links.
VLAN hopping can be initiated by an attacker who has access to a switch port belonging to the same VLAN as the native VLAN of the trunk link connecting to another switch that the victim is connected to. If the attacker knows the victim’s MAC address, it can forge a frame with two 802.1q tags and a layer 2 header with the destination address of the victim. Since the frame will ingress the switch from a port belonging to its native VLAN, the trunk port connecting to the victim’s switch will simply remove the outer tag because native VLAN traffic is to be untagged. The switch will forward the frame on to the trunk link unaware of the inner tag with a VLAN ID of which the victim’s switch port is a member.
To ensure the integrity of the trunk link and prevent unauthorized access, the ID of the native VLAN of the trunk port must be changed from the default VLAN (i.e., VLAN 1) to its own unique VLAN ID. The native VLAN ID must be the same on both ends of the trunk link; otherwise, traffic could accidentally leak between broadcast domains. Note: An alternative to configuring a dedicated native VLAN is to ensure that all native VLAN traffic is tagged. This will mitigate the risk of VLAN hopping since there will always be an outer tag for native traffic as it traverses an 802.1q trunk link.
Review the switch configurations and examine all trunk links. Verify the native VLAN has been configured to a VLAN ID other than the ID of the default VLAN (i.e. VLAN 1). If the native VLAN has the same VLAN ID as the default VLAN, this is a finding.